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Abstract - This paper intends to provide an economic analysis of the European
Monetary Union (EMU). The focus will be on examining the present fiscal policy
framework in the EMU. It will be argued that the enforcement of the current
framework is weak and has led to excessive deficits in the Eurozone. Measures to
strengthen the framework and restore fiscal discipline and sustainable debt levels in
the Eurozone will be analysed. It is submitted that the enforcement of the present
fiscal framework and fiscal discipline can be strengthened through Eurobonds that are
issued jointly by all members of the Eurozone. In order to provide for an effective
issuance mechanism a limited form of coordination would be needed that would
require minor amendments to existing institutions.
A. INTRODUCTION
This paper intends to provide an economic analysis of the European
Monetary Union (EMU). The focus will be on examining the present
fiscal policy framework in the EMU. It will be argued that the
enforcement of the current framework is weak and has led to excessive
deficits in the Eurozone. Measures to strengthen the framework and
restore fiscal discipline and sustainable debt levels in the Eurozone will
be analysed. It is submitted that the enforcement of the present fiscal
framework and fiscal discipline can be strengthened through Eurobonds
that are issued jointly by all members of the Eurozone. In order to provide
for an effective issuance mechanism a limited form of coordination would
be needed that would require minor amendments to existing institutions.
The paper will be structured into seven parts. Part B will offer a summary
of the theoretical foundations of the EMU while Part C will provide a
description of the current enforcement mechanism of fiscal discipline, the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Part D will give a summary of the
recent problems in the Eurozone. The most prominent suggestions to
reform the SGP will be analysed in Part E. Part F will discuss the creation
of a system of fiscal federalism in the EMU. The potential problems
arising from such a system will also be discussed. The advantages and
disadvantages of introducing Eurobonds will be summarised in Part G.
This section will also feature an analysis of specific proposals on how to
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implement Eurobonds. Part H will offer a proposal of how a Eurobonds
system could be effectively integrated in the current EMU framework.
Finally, the conclusion will offer a summary of the findings.
B. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE EMU
The EMU is founded upon the model of Optimum Currency Areas
pioneered by Mundell, which is based on the traditional Keynesian
assumption of fixed prices and wages. A country taking part in a
monetary union, which is hit by an exogenous shock, can no longer rely
on its own monetary and exchange rate policy to counteract such a
shock.' Thus, in the logic of the optimum currency area theory, entering a
monetary union entails the loss of one important tool of national
macroeconomics stabilisation policy, namely monetary policy. Given the
loss of monetary policy, one would expect that a fiscal system in the form
of a common budget would act as a buffer against shocks. Despite
structural funds to ensure convergence between rich and poor regions, the
overall Community budget is very modest.2 Due to its small size, the
budget cannot fulfil any significant role for macroeconomic stabilisation
and no additional insurance scheme was put into place. 3 Moreover, the
welfare state in all EMU members was created before they entered the
EMU. The distributive function is therefore assigned at national level.4
The EMU framework reinforces this division by stipulating that the basic
responsibility for fiscal policy remains at the national level.
Consequently, the Union budget does not carry out any stabilising
function.5 Fiscal policy in the EMU is therefore highly decentralised,
while monetary policy is unified under the auspices of the European
Central Bank (ECB). National policy makers rely on fiscal policy rather
than on the Community budget to provide macroeconomic stabilisation
against asymmetric shocks.6 Within this decentralised framework,
unilateral decisions to lower or to increase tax rates may create
Hedwig Ongena and Bernhard Winkler, 'Fiscal Policy in EMU' in Michael Artis
and Frederick Nixson (eds), The Economics of the European Union (OUP 2001), 315.
2 Guido Montani, 'The Role of the European Budget in European Economic Policy'
(2005) 3 The Federalist 136, 142.
3 Ongena and Winkler (n 1) 322.
4 Montani (n 2) 141.
5 ibid 142.
6 Paul De Grauwe, Economics ofMonetary Union (OUP 2009), 224.
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asymmetric shocks. The fact that social security and wage policies are
also decided at the national level is a further breeding ground for
asymmetric shocks. This can be illustrated by the case of France when it
decided alone to lower the working week to 35 hours, which had an
impact on the other members of the EMU. In a similar manner, Germany
has been applying tough wage moderation since 1999, thereby
significantly improving its competitive position at the expense of other
members of the EMU.7
The structural design of EMU, featuring a single monetary policy
while vesting responsibility for fiscal policy at the national level, has also
led to a supply-side fragmentation of the national bond markets.8 The
sovereign debt of each country in the Eurozone is issued under the control
of the respective Ministries of Finance. 9 Thus, at the moment, the market
is fragmented across 17 individual countries with different credit ratings
and issuance calendars. In this framework, liquidity is generally
concentrated among the larger EMU members such as Germany and
France. Therefore, smaller issuers have to compete with more liquid and
near-substitute bonds, which negatively affects the liquidity of their own
bonds. As a result, the overall euro-denominated government bond
market suffers from a lack of liquidity.'0 Within this market, many
countries have resorted to substituting default for currency risk in order to
relieve monetary pressure.
C. THE CURRENT FISCAL FRAMEWORK IN THE EMU
Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and
the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure provide the framework for
fiscal policies in the EMU. The Treaty set outs quantitative targets on the
size of government deficits and public debt, where 'member states shall
avoid excessive government deficits'." Compliance with fiscal discipline
7 Paul De Grauwe, 'Some Thoughts on Monetary and Political Union' in Leila
Simona Talani (ed), The future ofEMU (Palgrave Macmillan 2009), 14.
8 Werner Becker, 'The creation of a common European government bond. Arguments
against and alternatives' (2010) 14 Cahier Comte Boel 25, 30.
9 Maria Lorca-Susino, The Euro in the 21st Century: Economic Crisis and Financial
Uproar (Ashgate, 2011), 143.
10 John Berrigan, 'Joint issuance of euro-denominated government bonds' (2010) 14
Cahier Comte Boel 20.
1 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community [2007] OJ C306/01.
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is judged on the basis of two criteria, namely the 'ratio of the planned or
actual government deficit to gross domestic product' and the 'ratio of
government debt to gross domestic product'. 12 They must not exceed
certain reference values, which were set at 3% and 60% respectively.13
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was designed to enforce this
framework by coordinating national fiscal policies to ensure long-term
sustainability of public finances.
The Pact comprises both a preventive and dissuasive arm. The
preventive arm serves as an early warning system. Each EMU member
submits an annual stability programme, which includes its budgetary
position and the economic policy measures to achieve its budgetary
targets. The Commission will analyse each proposal and issue a proposal
to the Council. In case of concern, the latter can then issue an early
warning to prevent an excessive deficit. The Commission can also give
recommendations to a state concerning the consequences of its fiscal
policies.14 The dissuasive arm of the SGP takes effect if a state breaches
the 3% ceiling. This will trigger an excessive deficit procedure, where the
Council issues a recommendation to the respective state on how to
remedy the deficit identified. If the state does not comply with the
recommendation within a given time frame, it may be subject to financial
sanctions.' 5 Following some criticism, the SGP was amended in March
2005. The amendments were designed to make the interpretations of the
deficit ceilings more flexible, which included adjustments for cyclical
conditions. This evolution of the SGP stretched the limits of the Pact to a
maximum level of flexibility, without rendering it impotent.16
12 ibid.
13 Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure [2007] OJ C 115/279.
14 Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic
policies [1997] OJ L209/1.
1s Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [1997] OJ L209/6.
16 Antonio Fatas and Ilian Mihov, 'The Euro and Fiscal Policy' in Alberto Alesina
and Francesco Giavazzi (eds), Europe and the Euro (University of Chicago Press
2010), 294.
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D. THE EUROZONE CRISIS
To counteract the loss of authority over monetary policy, many EMU
members were abusing fiscal policy. This abuse was exacerbated after the
global financial crisis and the subsequent recession, which saw a need for
fiscal stimulus plans and bank bailouts. In order to implement these
measures, governments resorted to a drastic increase in spending,
financed by issuing more sovereign debt.' 7 As a result, many countries in
the Eurozone now have excessive deficits, far exceeding the 3% and 60%
limits set out by the Treaty. A further problem is the significant increase
of the sovereign yield spreads within the Eurozone. In the EU, yield
differentials are measured by the spread between the German yield and
national sovereign bond yields.' 8 Before the crisis, there were slight but
not significant yield differentials between the German Bund and the
yields of other countries.19 However, after the financial crisis investors
have been pursuing a policy of 'flight to quality', buying governments
bonds considered as safe from triple-A-rated countries like Germany.20
This has resulted in a sharp widening of sovereign debt spreads since
EMU members with a lower credit rating were faced with a much larger
interest rates on their debt. In February and March 2009, the interest rate
differential with respect to German debt was 100 basis points for Italy,
Portugal and Spain while Greece and Ireland faced an even higher
difference of 250 basis points.21 The unsustainable deficits of some
countries in the Eurozone have led to a loss of credibility among
investors, ultimately resulting in rating agencies downgrading the
sovereign debt rating of Greece.22 As a consequence, Greece had to pay a
higher credit risk premium on its sovereign debt. This had clear spill-over
effects as the increase in the Greek premium influenced the Italian
interest rate spread, which rose above the US BAA-AAA corporate
spread to reach nearly 200 basis points.2 3 Thus, the spread differentials
17 Lorca-Susino (n 9) 144.
1 ibid 153.
19 ibid 143.
20 Becker (n 8) 27.
21 Wim Kdsters, 'Common Euro Bonds -No Appropriate Instrument' (2009) 44
Intereconomics 135.
22 Lorca-Susino (n 9) 148.
23 Carlo Favero and Alessandro Missale 'EU Public Debt Management and
Eurobonds' in European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
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within the Eurozone widened further as members with weaker ratings,
who were already facing higher interest rates, saw credit risk premiums
rise even further. These developments cast doubt on whether some states,
Greece in particular, would be able to service their sovereign debt
considering their excessive current account deficit. Consequently, the fear
of government default became a tangible risk, as evidenced by the
increase in the demand for credit default swaps (CDSs).24 Moreover,
cross-border holdings of national bonds and the interlinked European
banking system have served as a channel for crisis transmission.2 5 Thus,
many banks holding Greek sovereign debt were facing the possibility of
26
sitting on illiquid assets.
In response to these developments, a rescue package of £750 billion
was created, comprising a £250 billion contribution from the IMF and
two new schemes. The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism
(EFSM) has a relatively small lending capacity of £60 billion while the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) may provide loans of up to
£440 billion. £110 billion were subsequently allocated to Greece. 27
However, the scheme was rather ineffective as Greece was still faced
with high interest rate of 5% on its sovereign debt. Thus, it was not able
to cut its debt level to sustainable levels but instead faced an even higher
debt burden.28 Consequently, a second bailout package for Greece in the
amount of £109 billion was agreed in 2011. The conditions of this
package were changed, resulting in longer periods of maturity and lower
interest rates on Greek debt. These favourable conditions were also
extended to Ireland and Portugal.2 9 It was further decided that the
temporary EFSF would be replaced by a permanent European
Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) in 2012. Both the EFSF and the ESM
will have a flexible credit line and their overall flexibility has been
(ed), Euro Area Governance - Ideas for Crisis Management Reforms (European
Parliament 2010) 102.
24 Lorca-Susino (n 9) 143.
25 Favero and Missale (n 23) 102.
26 Lorca-Susino (n 9) 186.
27 Wim Kdsters, 'Credible Rules, Not Discretion, Will Make the Euro Sustainable'
(2010) 45 Intereconomics 340.
28 Ansgar Belke and Christian Dreger, 'Ramifications of Debt Restructuring on the
Euro Area' (2011) 46 Intereconomics 188.
29 ibid 189.
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increased. They can also act in a pro-active manner to stabilise the
markets, using their resources to recapitalise banks and intervene in
secondary markets.30
Greece continued to struggle with unsustainable debt levels, and
therefore the second bailout package was increased to £130 billion in
February 2012. Moreover, a debt restructuring scheme was attached to
the package, which aimed to reduce Greece's debt burden through private
sector involvement (PSI). Greece made a tender offer to holders of Greek
law bonds under which they were to agree to a 53.5 per cent cut of the
nominal value of their bonds. 86 per cent of bondholders agreed to the
exchange and in order to increase the participation rate, Greece activated
collective action clauses (CACs) that allow the terms of bonds to be
modified if a certain percentage of bondholders agrees. However, the
activation of CACs resulted in the ISDA declaring this a 'credit event'31
which triggered payouts of C3 billion on Greek CDSs. The transaction
allowed Greece to cut C100 billion from its overall E350 billion debt. 32
In March 2012, 25 members of the EU, except for the United
Kingdom and the Czech Republic, signed a Fiscal Compact, which
requires the signatories to implement a provision into their domestic legal
system, which ensures that the government budget is balanced or in
surplus.33 Moreover, the Eurogroup, comprising the finance ministers of
the Eurozone, agreed to temporarily combine the lending capacities of the
ESM and the EFSF until the ESM is fully capitalised. Under this scheme
the EFSF will continue to service the £200 billion in loans it has already
granted to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Since the maximum lending
capacity of the ESM has been set at £500 billion, the combined lending
ceiling of the ESM and the EFSF will now be £700 billion. Combined
with 649 billion from the EFSM and £53 billion out of previous bilateral
30 Waltraud Schelkle, 'The Euro Area After Another Crisis Summit: Ignore the
Elephant in the Room at Your Peril' (2011) 46 Intereconomics 178.
31 EMEA Determinations Committee 'Statement' (9 March 2012)
<http://www.isda.org/dc/docs/EMEA Determinations Committee Statement 09032
012.pdf> accessed on 18 March 2012.
32 David Oakley, Joshua Chaffin and Richard Milne, 'Greek debt swap triggers
massive payouts' Financial Times (9 March 2012)
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7e3855ce-69ba- lel-a26e-
00144feabdcO.html#axzzlusOpl0Vy> accessed on 18 March 2012.
33 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary
Union 2012.
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loans from the first Greek rescue package an overall firewall of roughly
£800 billion has been put in place.3 4
One can conclude that the current enforcement of the EMU's fiscal
framework is weak, which manifests itself at the unsustainable debt levels
of many EMU members. Considering the excessive deficits in the
Eurozone, the SGP has clearly failed in enforcing fiscal discipline and
ensuring sustainable fiscal policies. Neither the preventive arm nor the
dissuasive arm of the excessive deficit procedure provided sufficient
incentives for countries to consolidate their public finances. 35 The
measures and bailout packages that have been recently implemented
present short-term solutions, which do not sufficiently strengthen the
existing fiscal framework. A permanent stabilisation mechanism is a step
forward but it is a rather superficial tool that will only intervene when the
risk of fiscal hazard is about to materialise. It does not provide long-term
incentives to countries for following the established deficit ceiling. The
recently bolstered firewall is less impressive upon closer examination.
Taking away the debt already committed, 'only' £500 billion are left,
which would certainly not be sufficient if larger Eurozone members such
as Spain or Italy could not service their debts anymore. The fiscal
compact, on the other hand, tackles the problem at its core by pushing
down deficits. However, this focus on austerity comes at the expense of
economic growth thereby curtailing economic recovery and rendering a
return to sustainable debt levels more difficult. A new system should
ideally provide both short-term flexibility that will allow fiscal policy to
act as a counter-cyclical instrument and a credible commitment to sound
public finances and long-term debt sustainability, while also providing
room for economic growth and recovery. A logical conclusion is that the
present weaknesses in the EMU fiscal framework can be attributed to the
limitations of the SGP. Consequently, it is the SGP itself that needs to be
reformed. Therefore, the following section will analyse proposals
suggesting a reform of the Pact.
34 Statement of the Eurogroup (30 March 2012)
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/129381.
pdf> accessed on 6 April 2012.
35 Peter Bofinger and Stefan Ried, 'A New Framework for Fiscal Policy
Consolidation in Europe' (2010) 45 Intereconomics 203, 204.
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E. SUGGESTED REFORMS OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
1. Extending the SGP to the National Level
Reform policies on a regional level affect the aggregate performance of a
monetary union.3 6 Thus, fiscal discipline could be strengthened by
focusing on the quality of national fiscal institutions. The SGP would be
complemented with a surveillance framework that encourages
governments to adopt procedures conducive to sound public finances.
However, this scheme poses problems in terms of the reliability of the
monitoring scheme and its costs. Giving an accurate estimate of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) would not be easy, if the bodies under
surveillance are too small in economic terms. This would affect the
meaningfulness of available data. Moreover, measuring local investment
expenditure that is financed through local taxation would also be
problematic. Large and costly projects would show up as expenditure
peaks, distorting the data. Finally, the high number of bodies that have to
be monitored could make this scheme very costly. 3 7
2. An Aggregate Deficit Criterion
Under the current fiscal framework, each country is responsible for
national fiscal policies. Thus, the aggregate fiscal stance is not taken into
account, which may lead to a suboptimal fiscal stance at the EMU level.
Therefore, the aggregate fiscal policy stance of the EMU should be
subject to the regulations of the SGP. Instead of each individual member
of the EMU, only the EMU as a whole would be subject to the 3% deficit
criterion. 38 However, if some members of the EMU had deficits below
the deficit ceiling, other members could run excessive fiscal policies as
long as the aggregate deficit of the EMU is below 3%. This would
provide a clear incentive for some states to free-ride on the stable budgets
36 Kenneth Kletzer and Jirgen von Hagen, 'Monetary Union and Fiscal federalism'
(2000) < http://www.uni-mannheim.de/edz/pdf/zei/b00-O1.pdf > accessed on 18
August 2012, 29.
37 Fabrizio Balassone and Daniele Franco, 'Fiscal Federalism and the Stability and
Growth Pact: A Difficult Union' in Marco Buti and Daniele Franco (eds), Fiscal
Policy in Economic and Monetary Union: Theory, Evidence and Institutions (Edward
Elgar Publishing Ltd 2005), 158.
38 Marco Buti, Sylvester Eijffinger and Daniele Franco, 'Revisiting EMU's Stability
Pact: A Pragmatic Way Forward' (2003) 19 Oxford Review ofEconomic Policy 100,
103.
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of other, thus exacerbating the risk of moral hazard. A change of the
budgetary rules to provide for an aggregate deficit criterion would
therefore not be advisable.
3. The Golden Rule
Blanchard and Giavazzi assert that the SGP is flawed in terms of the way
countries have to account for public investment. On this basis, they have
proposed a Golden Rule. When assessing a country's budget, current
expenditure in the form of nominal interest payments and capital
depreciation should be distinguished from net investment. The latter
should then be excluded from the deficit ceiling. 3 9 However, the fact that
deficit financing under this scheme is allowed may lead to opportunistic
behaviour where proponents of a particular investment project may
simply inflate the estimates of future revenues. Moreover, not including
tax reforms that generate future revenues or investment in human capital
40in budget calculations is not based on any sound theoretical foundation.
Excluding investment expenditure from the disciplinary framework of the
SGP altogether may also culminate in undesirable levels of fiscal laxity,
effectively giving a carte blanche on investment spending.
4. The Permanent Balance Rule
Buiter and Grafe envisage a Permanent Balance Rule that identifies a tax
rate that can provide a country's solvency while maintaining sustainable
levels of public debt. 4 1 This tax rate would be based on the principle that
future surpluses must not be exceeded by government debt. The rule
considers inflation rates and GDP growth as well as future sources of
revenues affected by public investment. By taking into account all these
factors, in can enhance a government's flexibility in terms of allowing
discretion from permanent fiscal levels.42 However, the practical
39 Olivier Blanchard and Francesco Giavazzi, 'Improving the SGP through a proper
accounting of public investment' (2004) CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4220
<http://economics.mit.edu/files/735> accessed on 14 August 2012, 3.
40 Lars Calmfors and Giancarlo Corsetti, 'How to Reform Europe's Fiscal Policy
Framework' (2003) 4 World Economics 109, 116.
41 Willem H. Buiter and Clemens Grafe, 'Patching up the Pact: Suggestions for
enhancing fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability in an enlarged European
Union' (2004) 12 Economics of Transition 67, 75.
42 ibid 77.
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application of this rule would involve complicated estimates of the
permanent value of tax and spending. Thus, policy makers would have to
make future predictions about growth rates as well as social and political
preferences. Such a prediction would be prone to many errors and is
therefore unlikely to yield sufficient results. 4 3
5. Exemptions from the Deficit Ceiling Based on an Index of
Institutional Reform
Eichengreen proposes that the SGP should focus on fiscal institutions
rather than numbers. Consequently, countries with low public debts
deficits should be exempted from the deficit ceiling. These exemptions
would be based on an 'explicit index of institutional reform'. 4 4 This index
would be designed and implemented by an independent committee.
Countries would receive points for structural reforms relating to their
pension schemes, labour markets or unemployment insurance systems. If
a country received three points, it would be exempted from the rules of
the SGP. Eichengreen asserts this exemption would be justified since
there would be no reason to 'expect that they will be prone to chronic
deficits'. Institutions that do not receive the necessary index points would
still be subject to the SGP's regulations and sanctions.4 5 This proposal
certainly provides a powerful incentive for countries to implement
structural reforms. However, this is not a long-term incentive. Once they
are freed from the restraints of the SGP, there is no mechanism that
prevents them from running new deficits.
6. Fiscal Coordination through a Market-Based Allocation of
National Deficit Shares
Drawing an analogy to pollution permits, Casella proposes to introduce a
system of tradable deficit permits where countries would be allowed to
trade rights to deficit creation. The market would then allocate the
permits at minimum costs and according to the financial needs of the
46
respective countries. At the beginning of the year, countries would be
43 Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (n 38) 106.
44 Barry Eichengreen, 'Institutions for Fiscal Stability' (2004) 50 CESifo Economic
Studies 1, 7.
45 ibid.
46 Alessandra Casella, 'Tradable Deficit Permits: Efficient Implementation of the
Stability Pact in the European Monetary Union' (1999) 14 Economic Policy 321, 326.
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allocated a number of deficit permits that amount to 3% of their GDP and
are freely tradable. In the next year, when fiscal statistics are made
public, countries must prove that they possess a sufficient number of
permits to cover their annual deficit. If a country is not able to cover its
deficit, it will incur a fine for each missing permit. Moreover, it will face
a cut in the number of permits allocated to it for the following year.47 The
main advantage of such a system is that it would not affect the aggregate
deficit of the EMU while allowing individual members to deviate from
the initial allowances in order to respond to economic shocks. 4 8 However,
the difficulty with this system is that the deficits of each regional or local
government are different and do no generate the same externality. Thus,
substituting one deficit permit for another may be difficult since they
would significantly differ in value. Determining an efficient system for
the initial allotment of permits would also be quite problematic. Possible
criteria such as the population of a member state would most likely result
in widely differing allocations, which would again result in political
tension. Moreover, the question of who would be in charge of such a
system is left unaddressed. If governments themselves would be
responsible, they could add exceptions or changes to the deficit ceiling,
thereby undermining the system and fiscal stability. 49
7. An Economic Policy Charter
Pisany-Ferry also suggests that the members of the EMU should adopt an
economic policy charter that would serve as a code of conduct.5 0 This
would cause some organisational problems. In order to ensure that
national policy decisions do not contradict the common charter this would
require that the interaction between charter and national budgetary
procedures would have to be streamlined to a great extent. 5 Moreover,
the charter 'would not have a binding character' but would merely
47 ibid 328.
48 ibid 329.
49 Balassone and Franco (n 37) 160.
so ibid 4.
51 Carlo Panico and Marta Vazquez Suarez, 'Policy Coordination in the Euro Area'
(2008) 96 Studi economici 5, 23.
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'represent a common understanding on economic policy principles'. 52
Thus, the whole intention of ensuring consistency between EMU and
national policies would be somewhat undermined. 5 3 This non-binding
nature of the charter would in fact be a step-down from the current
framework that, despite being ineffective, is still binding. A lack of
binding constraints as suggested by this proposal would be a fertile
breeding ground for free-riding and moral hazard.
8. Fiscal policy committees
Wyplosz believes that rules are too rigid and artificial to achieve both
short and long-term objectives. Institutions create superior incentives to
achieve these objectives.54 Wyplosz draws upon similarities between
fiscal and monetary policy and proposes to use Monetary Policy
Committees (MPCs) as points of reference for fiscal institutions. In
central banking it is common practice to delegate monetary policy to
MPCs that comprise an independent group of unelected experts. This
committee is given a clear constitutional mandate by the political
authorities to maintain price stability. The macroeconomic task of fiscal
policy in terms of maintaining budgetary balance is not too different from
monetary policy and can thus be delegated to an agent. On this basis,
Wyplosz suggests setting up Fiscal Policy Committees (FPCs). The
members of the latter would be unelected experts appointed for a fixed
duration, which would guarantee their full independence. The FPC would
be given a set debt target by the relevant political authorities. In order to
ensure its accountability, the FCP would answer to a national elected
body. 56 However, since the FCPs are accountable to a national body,
there is no incentive for governments to defer authority to them in terms
of maintaining debt stability. Moreover, the fact there would be an FCP in
every country would merely add an additional bureaucratic layer. Every
FCP would be likely to implement measures that would rectify fiscal
52 Jean Pisani-Ferry, 'Fiscal Discipline and Policy Coordination in the Eurozone:
Assessment and Proposals' (2002) < http://www.pisani-ferry.net/base/re02-gea-
discipline-vmai.pdf> accessed on 8 August 2012, 4.
53 Panico and Suarez (n 51) 23.
54 Charles Wyplosz, 'Fiscal Discipline in EMU: Rules or Institutions?' (2002) Paper
prepared for the Group of Economic Analysis of the European Commission, 4.
5 ibid 5.56 ibid 9.
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imbalances in their country of origin, and would not necessarily pay
attention how these measures would affect the rest of the EMU. This
would further exacerbate the problem of the EMU's decentralised fiscal
framework.
A watered down version of Wyplosz's concept has been proposed by
Eijffinger. He envisages a Fiscal Experts Panel (FEP) that would give
advice to the European Parliament on matters of fiscal policy. Like the
FPCs suggested by Wyplosz the members of the panel would be
independent experts that would be appointed for specified period. The
FEP would be responsible for the current and future fiscal imbalances of
the members of the EMU. They would then provide advice on how these
imbalances could be rectified.5 8 This is a good proposal but it would need
to be complemented with a system that provides strong incentives for
countries to follow the recommendations of the FEP.
In summary, with the exception of Eijffinger's proposal, the
suggested reforms of the SGP would not significantly strengthen the
fiscal framework but lead to new problems instead. On this basis, the
SGP should remain unchanged. The 2005 reform has already increased
the flexibility of the Pact. Any further amendments would merely water it
down unnecessarily, leaving it bereft of any significance. Thus, the SGP
should remain a cornerstone of the EMU fiscal framework but the
framework itself needs to be stabilised. One alternative would be
transforming the EMU into a fiscal federal union, where a centralised
stabilisation scheme would automatically stabilise fiscal imbalances.
F. FISCAL FEDERALISM
The perceived Achilles heel of the Euro is that represents a federal
currency without a federal fiscal system.59 Common fiscal institutions can
provide stabilisation across geographic regions and thus members of a
57 Sylvester Eijffinger, 'Legislative proposals on EU economic governance' in A
Makipaa (ed.) Legislative proposals on EU economic governance: what is missing
within and beyond. Compilation ofBriefing Papers (European Parliament 2010)
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN>
accessed on 4 August 2012, 37.
58 ibid.
59 Montani (n 2) 136.
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monetary union.60 In a monetary union, it may therefore be desirable to
centralise part of the national budgets of member states to the federal
level. Consequently, a European system of fiscal federalism could be
created. This would entail a system of transfers among EMU members in
the form of an expanded Community budget. In this scheme,
contributions and expenditures would be linked to the economic situation
of a country and act as a buffer during periods of cyclical divergence.61
Spill-over effects would thus be internalised. This central budget would
act both as a redistributive device as well as a stabilising instrument. 62 if
regions experience asymmetric macroeconomic shocks, deficit- spending
at the federal level would be used to stabilise weaker regions. 6 3
In principle, a centralisation of national budgets would serve to
accommodate for asymmetric shocks in the different member states of the
EMU. Such a centralised budget would reduce the social costs of a
monetary union by allowing countries and regions that are hit by negative
shocks to enjoy automatic transfers. 64 An EMU stabilisation scheme
would provide insurance across regions through a system of fiscal
transfers that would redistribute income from those regions which
experience favourable economic developments relative to the EMU
average to those which suffer from an adverse economic shock.65 Under
such a system, a fall in income would result in declining tax payments,
thereby absorbing the impact of the original shock. A rising
unemployment rate would also induce increased transfers, which would
cushion the subsequent loss of income.66 In theory, this would provide
insurance through redistribution of income across different regions at any
60 Erik Jones, 'European Fiscal Policy Co-ordination and the Persistent Myth of
Stabilization' in Leila Simona Talani (ed), The future ofEMU (Palgrave Macmillan
2009), 47.
61 Barry Eichengreen, 'The Breakup of the Euro Area' in Alberto Alesina and
Francesco Giavazzi (eds), Europe and the Euro (University of Chicago Press 2010),
41.
62 De Grauwe, 'Some Thoughts on Monetary and Political Union' (n 7) 15.
63 Michael Hutchison and Kenneth Kletzer, 'Fiscal Convergence Criteria, Factor
Mobility, and Credibility in Transition to Monetary Union in Europe' in Barry
Eichengreen, Jeffrey Frieden and Jilrgen von Hagen (eds), Monetary and Fiscal
Policy in an Integrated Europe (Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co
1995), 150.
64 De Grauwe, Economics ofMonetary Union (n 6) 224.
65 Ongena and Winkler (n 1) 316.
66 Jones (n 60) 47.
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point in time. 67 Hence, a system of fiscal federalism would replace
regional fiscal policies for stabilising regional incomes in the face of
differential aggregate supply and demand shocks. 68
1. Problems
There are some inherent problems in creating an effective as well as
neutral centralised stabilisation scheme. It is difficult to design a
budgetary transfer mechanism in a way that avoids one of the classic
problems of insurance literature, namely that of moral hazard. Under the
latter, insurance affects the incentives of the insured to behave in a way
that limits risky behaviour. Weaker countries may be tempted to profit
from the compensation received through fiscal transfers rather than trying
to reduce their vulnerability to economic shocks.69 Moreover, social
security transfers reduce the need to adjust. They tend to keep real wages
in the depressed regions too high, thereby reducing the incentive for the
population of the respective region to move out to more prosperous
regions. Consequently, interregional transfers have the potential to
become self-perpetuating. Budgetary transfers should therefore only
apply to temporary shocks and if a shock is permanent transfers should be
used only on a temporary basis.7 0 However, from a practical point of
view, it is not easy to separate temporary and permanent shocks and thus
'pure' insurance from the redistribution of wealth and income for other
motives.7 1 Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that it is difficult to
use regional budgetary transfers in a temporary manner. The results
shows that when a region experiences a negative shock such as the
Mezzogiorno in Italy, or the eastern Lander in Germany, the transfers
through the centralised social security system tend to acquire a permanent
character.72
The fact that for a stabilisation system to be effective, a continuous
redistribution of resources through taxes and transfers is required presents
an additional problem. Only a shock through income changes rather than
through income levels would trigger a response from the stabilisation
67 Ongena and Winkler (n 1) 316.
68 Hutchison and Kletzer (n 63) 49.
69 Ongena and Winkler (n 1) 317.
70 De Grauwe, Economics ofMonetary Union (n 6) 225.
71 Ongena and Winkler (n 1) 317.
72 De Grauwe, Economics ofMonetary Union (n 6) 225.
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mechanism. If a country with high income suffered an exogenous shock,
part of the income lost by its wealthiest citizens would be absorbed by
declining tax outlays. In turn, transfer payments would replace part of the
income lost by less wealthy citizens who face unemployment. However,
the described effects could also have undesirable consequences. In case
of a shock that only affects the wealthier members of the EMU, poorer
countries would have to provide a cushion for the latter. Logically, they
would be very reluctant to stabilise the income of the wealthier member
states in response to exogenous shocks.7 3 In fact, it would represent a
perversion of the scheme if at one point Greece or Ireland had to stabilise
the income of Germany or France.
Large and potentially permanent regional transfers will result in new
political problems. A jurisdiction that is diverse in terms of its political
structure is less likely to offer insurance against shocks to all the
citizens.74 When the sense of national identity is weak, this can
effectively lead to a break-up of a country since the taxpayers of the more
prosperous regions could simply reject payments to the poorer one. This
risk can be illustrated by looking at the German system for
Finanzausgleich between regional governments. During the German
unification, integrating the eastern Lander proved to be difficult since the
western Lander were reticent to make further payments to the East, as
they were not considered proper members of the federation. Eventually,
the German federal government was forced to absorb much of the costs.75
This is further exacerbated at the European level because the Eurozone
comprises diverse national identities and the sense of national
identification is much less developed than at the country level.76 A 'deep
variable' or European identity would be necessary to maintain social and
77political cohesion but is absent at the European level. As a consequence,
resistance to intercountry transfers may be considerable. This could result
73 Jones (n 60) 49.
74 Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir and William Easterly, 'Public Goods and Ethnic
Divisions' (1999) 114 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1243, 1274.
75 Jones (n 60) 48.
76 Eichengreen (n 61) 42.
7 De Grauwe, 'Some Thoughts on Monetary and Political Union' (n 7) 26.
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in political problems, which would further endanger the unity of the
Eurozone.
The other problem with a system of fiscal federalism would be that
of democratic accountability. Under the present framework, national
governments and parliaments are responsible for spending and taxation
since democratic legitimacy is vested in these institutions. Any decision
of a government to increase or decrease spending or taxation is judged by
its national electorate. In contrast, the current control and sanctioning
procedure imposed by the SPG is carried out by institutions that are
perceived as lacking that very democratic legitimacy.79 Entirely replacing
national fiscal policies with fiscal federalism would entail a further loss
of autonomy, thereby exacerbating the inherent democratic deficit of the
current framework. Keeping responsibility for fiscal policy at the national
level may therefore be preferable for reasons of accountability.80
Moreover, in order to achieve effective transfers, either the
Community budget would have to be significantly expanded or
amendments to the current Treaty would have to be made.8 ' This would,
however, raise the question of whether countries that are not part of the
Eurozone would be willing to participate in these transfers. They made a
conscious decision to not enter the Eurozone and would now be forced to
stabilise a monetary union, which they specifically chose not to be a part
of. The alternative would be creating a system of interstate transfers
without the active involvement of the other EU members that would only
include members of the Eurozone. 82 Such a system would be likely to
result in further fragmentation of the EU rather than facilitating political
integration. Consequently, a significant transfer of budgetary power as
well as a full centralisation of all areas of budgetary policy could be
problematic. Thus, one should look to limited forms of centralisation.
Rather than a fully centralised stabilisation scheme, a central debt
instrument that would be cross-guaranteed by all the countries in the
Eurozone may strengthen the fiscal framework. A common Eurobond is
78 De Grauwe, Economics ofMonetary Union (n 6) 225.
79 De Grauwe, 'Some Thoughts on Monetary and Political Union' (n 7) 22.
80 Ongena and Winkler (n 1) 317.
81 Eichengreen (n 61) 41.
82 ibid 42.
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an instrument that would satisfy this criterion and will be analysed in the
following section.
G. EUROBONDS
1. Advantages
A common European government bond would promote further market
integration as well as greater debt management coordination. The
efficiency gains from a unified bond market would lead to enhanced
liquidity. Greater liquidity would, in turn, reduce liquidity premia and the
costs of borrowing for EMU members, with greater advantages for states
with a lower credit rating. 83 In order to illustrate this, one has to consider
that the credit quality of a bond just guaranteed by France and Germany
would be greater than the weighted average of the credit standings of
other countries in the Eurozone. 84 Such a common bond with higher
liquidity would thus eliminate interest rate spreads across the Eurozone,
resulting in cheaper budget financing.85 This would be particularly
beneficial for countries that were severely affected by the financial crisis,
* * 86in terms of easing their economic recovery.
Most importantly, Eurobonds would provide insurance against credit
risk and ensure continued market access to sovereign issuers who may
have been shut out of the latter. As seen by the current situation, shocks
originating in one country can have negative spill-over effects across the
EMU, affecting credit risk premia and increasing the probability of crisis
in other states. Consequently, a common debt backed by joint guarantees
of all countries in the Eurozone or an EU Institution would reduce
exposure to crisis transmission from contagion. Moreover, providing
insurance to the country with the weakest fundamentals would work as an
EMU-wide safety mechanism since it would also benefit all other states.87
Finally, since Eurobonds would be jointly guaranteed by several
countries, the risk of default would be extremely low. This would make
83 Favero and Missale (n 23) 101.
84 ibid 102.
85 Otmar Issing, 'Why a common eurozone bond isn't such a good idea' (2009) 12
Europe's World 76, 77.
86 Becker (n 8) 27.
87 Favero and Missale (n 23) 102.
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them extremely attractive for investors in large foreign-exchange reserves
such as China, thereby enhancing the standing of the Euro as a reserve
88
currency.
2. Disadvantages
The most common argument against Eurobonds is that they undermine
fiscal discipline by removing incentives for sound budgetary policies. The
general political opposition derives from the fear that Eurobonds could
create a moral hazard problem within the EMU. Thus, a country could
free ride on the obligations of others who, in case of default, would be
legally obliged to assume its debt and foot the bill. Countries with a
strong credit rating such as Germany are particularly wary of this
problem. In addition, due to the elimination of credit risk spreads
financial markets could not perform their traditional function of acting as
disciplinary restraints through higher interest rates. 89 Thus, countries with
low credit ratings could be tempted to neglect fiscal discipline and run
excessive budget deficits since they would rely on being bailed out in any
case. 90 In a similar manner, states with sound budgets and low debts
would be tempted to run lax fiscal policies and take up more debt. This
would effectively undermine the credibility of the EMU.91
Another potential problem of a common sovereign bond is the
equitable sharing of the benefits and costs of this debt instrument. The
issue is particularly important as the success of Eurobonds depends on the
willingness of countries in the Eurozone to use common bonds as funding
instruments.92 States with both weak budgets and credit ratings have a
clear incentive to quickly move to Eurobonds since they will make
budget financing a lot cheaper. Moreover, all countries participating in
the issuance of a Eurobond would benefit from greater liquidity.
However, states with sound budgetary polices and low debts would
potentially face higher credit risk premia and borrowing costs, while
88 Sergio Mayordomo, Juan Ignacio Pefia and Eduardo Schwartz, 'Towards a
Common European Union Risk Free Rate' (2009)
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1569675> accessed 14 August
2012, 2.
89 ibid 104.
90 Becker (n 8) 29.
91 Favero and Missale (n 23) 104.
92 ibid 103.
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effectively subsidising countries with weaker fiscal fundamentals. Hence,
states with the high credit ratings would not necessarily have an incentive
to join the scheme since they could face additional costs from the
mutualisation of credit risk.93
The introduction of Eurobonds may also result in higher interest
rates for existing national bonds. 9 4 Eurobonds would connect fiscal
responsibility and burden sharing within the EMU framework. Thus,
countries with a triple-A rating would have to provide guarantees
regarding interest payments and the redemption of the bonds for countries
with lower ratings. However, if financial markets expect considerable
amounts of new Eurobonds to be issued, interest rates on existing national
bonds of countries with a high credit rating may rise significantly over
time. This would adversely affect their interest payments in terms of
financing not only their current budget deficits but also the refinancing of
their maturing debt. Moreover, given their prospective high public
borrowing requirements, this rise in interest rates may have a long-term
negative impact on their credit rating.95 From a political point of view,
countries with rising interest rates will face public discontent, since the
additional financing will lead to higher tax burdens for their citizens. 9 6
This could result in severe political repercussions, which would present a
big hurdle to joint issuance. 9 7 It would be seen as an inherent
contradiction if countries with sound budgets and stable fiscal policies
would have to pay a higher price to support countries with high deficits
and weak public finances. Such a scenario would further undermine the
stability status of the Eurozone, and thus the confidence of its citizens. 9 8
Considering the absence of a European identity and the less than positive
image of the Eurozone in many public opinion polls, a further increase in
euro-scepticism would certainly not be desirable. 99
Eurobonds would lead to increased liquidity and be very attractive
for investors. This would trigger higher capital inflows and result in an
increased exchange rate of the euro against the dollar. However, this
93 ibid 106.
94 Becker (n 8) 28.
9' ibid.
96 Issing (n 85) 77-78.
97 Berrigan (n 10) 24.
98 Issing (n 85) 79.
99 Becker (n 8) 29.
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perceived advantage could have severe repercussions. As seen by the
period from 2007 to 2010, with rates between 1.30 and 1.60 USD/EUR a
strong euro could have a very negative impact on the price
competitiveness of the export sector in the Eurozone. 00 Another
stumbling block would be the fact that Eurobonds are jointly guaranteed
by all EMU members so they could, in principle, be liable for or assume
the debt obligations of another government. However, this would violate
the no-bailout clause and thus constitute a breach of Article 125 of the
Lisbon Treaty.101 In light of these potential difficulties, the following
sections will analyse concrete proposals for issuing Eurobonds.
3. Eurobonds Based on EIB Equity Shares
The hypothesis by De Grauwe and Moesen envisages a single debt
instrument issued by a group of EMU members. In order to raise the
necessary funds the respective obligations would be divided between
participating countries in specifically fixed proportions. The interest rate
on the common bond would be a weighed average of the yields observed
in each national bond market at the time of issue. These weights would be
calculated by reference to the individual equity shares of the participating
countries in the European Investment Bank (EIB). The proceeds of the
bond issue would then be distributed to the participants using the same
weights. Finally, the yearly interest rate to be paid by each country on its
part of the issue would be based on the national interest rates used to
compute the average interest rate on the Eurobond.102 Consequently, each
participating state would guarantee only its share of the instrument. While
the Eurobond would trade as a single debt instrument, participants would
not be liable for the debt of other issuers. Each country would be liable
only for the interest payments and principal redemption that correspond
to its share of the bond. The credit standing of such a common bond
would be perceived as the average of the credit standings of the
participating countries. Its liquidity, on the other hand, would certainly be
greater than that of the national bonds of the participating countries.103
"o ibid 27.
101 Kdsters (n 21) 137.
102 Paul De Grauwe and Wim Moesen, 'Gains for all: A proposal for a common euro
bond' (2009) 44 Intereconomics 132, 136.
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The great advantage of this proposal is that it significantly reduces
the risk of moral hard since countries pay the same rate as on their
national government bonds.104 Thus, the incentive of countries with
weaker credit rating to free ride on triple-A-rated countries would
decrease. Moreover, the common argument against Eurobonds that states
with a stronger credit rating may be penalised by higher interest rates
would no longer apply.'0 5 The other advantage of this proposal is the fact
that participants are not jointly but merely severally liable to the extent of
their contributions. This design does not bring the scheme in conflict with
any legal provisions, namely the no-bailout clause. At the same time, the
proposal guarantees access to the market for all participants, which would
greatly benefit countries such as Greece.
One of the shortcomings of this proposal is its limited degree of
flexibility. In order to enhance liquidity and facilitate the pricing of risk,
subsequent bond issues would have to be comparable over time. This
could, however, only be ensured by keeping both the set of participating
countries and their shares in the common bond constant over time.10 6
There also exists the risk of implicit guarantees by stronger countries
participating in the scheme as they would not want to let it break down.
The determination of the yield to be paid may also be problematic
because the national bond markets may be distorted when Eurobonds are
introduced.10 7 Finally, in this scheme payments would be linked to the
interest rates on national bonds. However, interest rates are not ideal
proxies for credit risk and may therefore over- or understate the risk. 08
The resulting uncertainty over the real risk of the bonds might reduce its
attractiveness in the eyes of investors. Moreover, in the author's opinion
the fact that countries will still pay the same interest rate as on their
national bond would not contribute to eliminating the significant interest
rate spreads in the Eurozone. Thus, budget financing will still remain
104 Sylvester Eijffinger, 'Eurobonds - Concepts and Implications' in D Kolassa (ed.)
Eurobonds - Concepts and Implications: Compilation ofNotes for the Monetary
Dialogue ofMarch 2011 (European Parliament 2011)
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN>
accessed on 28 July 2012, 10.
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relatively expensive which would certainly not speed economic recovery.
One way would be to use the current reduced interest rates, but they were
envisaged as a short-term solution on Greece's current debt. Furthermore,
offering continued market access for states with high credit risk and
interest rates is somewhat self-defeating. The scheme does not set any
debt ceiling in terms of permissible lending. Thus, it does not provide any
incentive for states to consolidate their finances. Markets may punish
unsustainable budgets with higher interest rates but these disciplinary
measures will be somewhat futile if the countries in question enjoy
continued access to new funding, thereby circumventing the punishment
of higher interest rates.
4. EMU Fund
Boonstra proposes to move from national to central financing for all
public debt, thereby abolishing the possibility for countries to separately
raise debt on financial markets. A newly created and independent EMU
fund would be in charge of issuing Eurobonds.10 9 The common bonds
would be backed by several and joint guarantees where each participating
issuer would guarantee the totality of the obligations of the common
instrument. In this scheme, the countries with the best credit ratings,
namely Germany and France, would serve as a basis for the overall credit
standing of the common government bond. Their participation would
ensure a lower credit risk premium than the weighted average of the
participating countries even if some of them had lower credit standings.110
The EMU fund would finance itself by issuing bonds in the markets and
the proceeds would be issued to the participating countries. The latter
would be charged a fee that includes their funding costs plus a margin.
This margin would be based on the deficit and public debt of the
respective country, as measured against the deficit and debt deviations
from the average levels of Germany and France. Since the latter provide
the benchmark against which all other countries are judged, neither of
109 Wim Boonstra, 'Central funding of public deficits, combined with a renewed
Stability and Growth Pact, can stabilize the eurozone' (2011) 2011 Rabobank
Working Paper Series No. 02
<www.rabobank.com/content/images/WP 1102wbo%20central%20funding%20EMU
%20fund tcm43-134863.pdf> accessed on 2 August 2012, 7.
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them would have to pay a margin. If a country performs better than
France and Germany, it would be absolved from paying the margin."'
Thus, there is a strong incentive for countries to improve their fiscal
deficits. On the other hand, countries that run excessive deficits will be
subject to punishment. Overall, fiscal stability would be improved,
thereby strengthening the EMU fiscal framework. The several and joint
guarantees of the participating states are a potential violation of the no-
bailout clause. However, this concern is addressed by the funds amassed
through the premium payments. Consequently, in the unlikely event of a
country defaulting, these funds would act as a buffer.
Nonetheless, this scheme also faces potential problems. In particular
the setting of the parameters and the base rate for the premia may be
problematic. Mayordomo proposes a compensation scheme based on the
indexation of the interests paid by the participants. Consequently, each
country would pay on its share of the Eurobond a margin equal to the
credit risk premium, as measured by CDS, on its national bonds while the
remaining interest payments would be proportional to the share of the
Eurobond.112 However, while risk premium measured by CDS may
provide an accurate assessment for bonds issued on national markets, this
may not be the case for Eurobonds. Using CDS to assess a bond backed
by the joint guarantees of several countries may potentially overstate the
credit-risk contribution of the participants. 113
Moreover, while arguably imposing fiscal discipline, the additional
premium would not reduce the interest rate spreads within the EMU.
Depending on the level of the premium, it might not even be beneficial
for countries with weak budgets to join this scheme. The participation of
France and Germany would indeed be crucial for the effectiveness of the
scheme since they would guarantee a lower credit risk rating of a
common bond. However, linking the premium to their fiscal policies
would not necessarily guarantee fiscal prudence. Both countries have
been known to disregard the SGP. In fact, when they first exceeded the
3% deficit limit, they tried to escape both the early warning and the
excessive deficit procedure. They avoided a fine and even succeeded in
" Boonstra (n 109) 7.
112 Mayordomo, Pefta and Schwartz (n 88) 18.
113 Favero and Missale (n 23) 106.
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changing the rules of the SGP in their favour.114 With this history, the
question arises whether they would pay have to pay higher premia once
they exceed a certain limit and if they would be willing to do so. Thus,
there may be the risk that they would exert political pressure to keep their
premium-free status, which would undermine the whole purpose of the
scheme.
5. Blue and Red Debt
Delpla proposes to divide debt into senior (Blue) and junior (Red) debt." 5
The proposal states that countries should pool their debt to the Maastricht
limit of a maximum of 60% of GDP in senior blue bonds. Beyond the
60% level, they would have to go to the capital market on their own,
which would lead to higher borrowing costs. This part of the debt would
be the junior debt in the form of red bonds. Sovereign debt would be
tranched so that the senior blue bonds would have greater liquidity and a
lower risk of default. The junior red bonds, on the other hand, would be
less liquid and carry the same default risk as before. Since red bonds
would be subject to higher interest rates, countries would have an
incentive to consolidate their budget to bring their debt to below 60% of
GDP. The task of allocation of risk would fall to an independent
committee, which would analyse the debt path and fiscal policies of the
participating countries. On this basis, the committee would outline the
prudent allocation of senior debt for each country over the next fiscal
116
year.
The advantages of this scheme include the elimination of interest
rate spreads for blue debt. This would lead to improved liquidity of a
large part of government debt, resulting in lower borrowing costs.
Moreover, this scheme could serve as commitment device for countries
with weak fiscal policies to improve their budgetary balance. Imposing a
ceiling of 60% of GDP on the blue bond quota effectively links the
scheme to fiscal discipline, thereby strengthening the credibility of the
SGP.117 However, the fact that the debt is guaranteed severally and jointly
114 Kdsters (n 21) 136.
115 Jacques Depla, 'Blue bonds: creating a pan-European common government debt'
(2010) 14 Cahier Comte Boel 15.
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by the participating members also presents a potential infringement of the
no-bailout clause. The risk of default arising under scheme is very low as
it promotes and rewards responsible borrowing. In the unlikely event that
a country should default, an orderly bankruptcy procedure could provide
an adequate safety mechanism. 8 The author envisages that a new
stability council should be established that would be responsible for the
administration of the scheme.1 19 However, this would require the existing
Treaty to be amended or a new Treaty to be signed, which would then
also affect countries outside the Eurozone. Considering the trouble
preceding the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, amending an existing or
signing an entirely new Treaty would very likely cause further problems.
The original proposal by Depla excludes Greece from participating
in the scheme due to its history of falsifying data and lying about the true
state of its public finances.12 0 While this is, in principle, a valid argument,
excluding a country that would greatly benefit from cheaper financing to
consolidate its finances would not be conducive to restoring the fiscal
balance of the Eurozone. Using the example of Greece, the other question
that arises is whether the scheme would be effective for countries whose
senior debt levels exceed 60%. This could be solved by adding grey
bonds to the red and blue bonds scheme. Grey bonds would then
represent old debt that precedes the start of the scheme.121 This debt
would attract the same interest rates as before the start of the scheme. In
the case of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, this would mean that they could
still profit from the reduced interest rates that were agreed upon after the
second bailout. In the meantime, they could pool the other 60% of their
debt into blue bonds, which would guarantee greater liquidity, allowing
them to consolidate their finances.
Moreover, the issue of outside borrowing is not addressed. Hence, to
further strengthen the credibility of the scheme, it would be beneficial to
include an agreement prohibiting participants to borrow 'on the side'.12 2
Finally, the transition from the current debt to the new system of red and
blue bonds is somewhat problematic. Delpla proposes a phasing out of
118 ibid.
119 Depla (n 115) 17.
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121 ibid 19.
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national debt by letting blue and red bond issues replace national
bonds.123 While there may be strong incentives for investors, the
replacement itself is mandatory as a forcible exchange would be
considered as default, that would could severe turmoil in the financial
markets.1 24 However, such a voluntary replacement procedure is
problematic. Some private investors may use the exchange scheme to
their advantage by free-riding and refusing to replace their bonds. This
would put additional pressure on other investors to buy them out.
However, while not entirely eliminating the risk, collective action clauses
could potentially reduce free-riding. The effectiveness of such clauses
would depend on the stipulated threshold that, given a certain percentage
of investors is present, would allow them to act on behalf of the whole
group. To solve this problem, the new debt criteria could only be applied
to fresh debt while holders of old debt could still exchange their bonds on
a voluntary basis. 12 5
6. Eurobonds Issued by an EU Institution
The final proposal is a common bond issued by an EU Institution. The
respective institution would lend the funds raised with common bonds to
EU members at an interest rate that reflects the funding costs. These
bonds would be backed by the several and joint guarantees of the 27 EU
members. The guarantees would not be explicit but derive from the EU
legal order. If, for example, the common bond were issued by the
European Commission the guarantees would derive from the legal
obligations under the EU Treaty. On the other hand, if the bonds were
issued by the EIB, it would be backed by the capital subscribed by EU
members. In both cases, the issued bonds would have a very low risk
premium and benefit from high credit quality.12 6 The fact that such bonds
would be practically riskless, since they have the backing of all EU
member states, would make them extremely attractive for investors.
Moreover, the risk of moral hazard would be reduced by distributing
123 Depla (n 115) 18.
124 ibid 19.
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losses across EU members according to where they arose.127
The major limitation of this proposal is that it fails to take into
account the diversity of the existing institutional arrangements that link
the members of the EU.12 8 The EU Treaty concerns all 27 Members
whereas, at the time of writing, the Eurozone features only 17 members.
Thus, if a common EU Institution were to become the single issuer of
such bonds, non-Eurozone countries would have to guarantee the debt of
the Eurozone.129 This would very likely lead to strong political
opposition, at worst resulting in further fragmentation of the EU.
Moreover, merging under a single arrangement would be problematic
because it would ignore the differences of institutional arrangements
between the EU and the Eurozone. As a consequence, markets as well as
investors could become very confused. They would not know whether
EIB securities benefiting from a joint and several guarantee of its 27
shareholders would be superior to securities guaranteed by members of
the Eurozone and vice versa.130
The fact the bonds would be guaranteed through the EU legal order
and thus by its members presents a potential violation of the no-bailout
clause. Bestowing upon an institution the power to raise funds for deficit
financing would require a change in the present legal framework.
However, as mentioned, going through the bureaucratic procedure of
amending the existing Treaty could be very problematic. This could be
circumvented by relying on Article 352, which allows the Council to
adopt actions necessary for the attainment of the Treaties' objectives.
Another alternative would be to allow the European Commission to raise
funds under Article 122(2). The scope of the latter is restricted to
financial assistance by the Council in case of difficulties caused by
exceptional circumstances.1 3 1
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7. Alternatives to Eurobonds
One alternative could be common bonds issued by countries with the
same credit ratings. This would not necessitate a Eurozone-wide
guarantee scheme, which would reduce risk of free-riding and moral
hazard. Countries with a triple-A rating such as Germany and France
would not issue common bonds since they would not derive any
significant benefits from doing so. A bond issued by a group of countries
with a double-A-rating, on the other hand, may have greater liquidity.
However, an alliance of states with a simple A-rating would be weak and
thus fail to generate sufficient liquidity. The risk of bailout in this scheme
is less pronounced but the question of whether there is a potential
infringement of the no-bailout clause remains.13 2 Under this scheme,
interest rate spreads would be eliminated within the group of the issuing
countries but it would still be present within the Eurozone. Moreover, the
common bonds under this scheme would have to compete with the more
liquid bonds of triple-A-rated countries such as Germany. Investors
would most likely prefer the latter's bonds. Thus, it is doubtful whether
there would be a prominent increase in liquidity, sufficient to act as an
incentive for countries to join the scheme.
Another alternative would be a common bond issued by both small
and medium-sized countries.133 This would involve the participation of
states with different ratings while Germany and France would be
excluded from the scheme. The design of such a bond would be similar to
the joint bond issued by German federal states. Despite having low
borrowing needs, they had to invest or raise funds in the money market
between their issuing dates. Hence, some federal states issued joint
Jumbo bonds to avoid additional liquidity management costs. Investors
benefited from higher liquidity as well as risk-free assets since the bonds
were jointly and severally guaranteed by the issuing federal states. On a
European level, common bonds issued by small and medium-sized EMU
countries would provide for greater flexibility in terms of coordinating
issuing activities. Becker states that countries should only cooperate in
issuing common bond with the EMU members that 'have a good track
132 Becker (n 8) 30.
133 ibid.
109
UCL Journal ofLaw and Jurisprudence
record of fiscal policy'. 134 Thus, countries would have an incentive to
pursue sound fiscal policies in order to be invited to participate in a
common bond.13' However, considering the financial track record of
countries in the Eurozone, this would leave relatively few parties that
would qualify for the scheme. Moreover, like the previous proposal, this
scheme is marred by a potential lack of liquidity as a result of the wide
interest rate differentials in the Eurozone. In a competition with French
and German bonds, even with the common guarantees of all other EMU
members, the latter stand to lose.
H. PROPOSAL FOR AN EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF EUROBONDS
In the author's opinion, Depla's proposal is best suited to strengthen the
fiscal framework of the EMU and enforce discipline in the Eurozone, but
some amendments need to be made to make it effective. In order to create
a thick market, Eurobonds would have to be sufficiently large, regular
and predictable. Thus, they would have to be based on an issuing calendar
that specifies the minimum amounts to be offered.136 Moreover, there are
situations that have an impact on the entire Eurozone, thereby potentially
affecting the credit quality of the bonds. Since Eurobonds provide
increased liquidity, this may result in higher capital inflows and an
increased exchange rate of the euro. The ECB would have to counteract
these increases. Consequently, it would be advisable for countries to issue
Eurobonds alongside a supranational institution that would be able to
account for all these factors and coordinate the bond issues. Creating a
new institution would just add an unnecessary layer to the European
bureaucracy and thus an existing institution should assume the task.
Given its intended role of stabilising the EMU, the EFSF and its
successor the ESM would be the best solution. In order to account for the
potential factors affecting the EMU and thus the bond issues, the scope of
the EFSF (and ESM) should be broadened to provide for greater
coordination with representatives of the European Commission and the
ECB.1 37 It would also be advisable to introduce a requirement that, in
addition to their annual stability programmes, countries participating in
134 ibid 31.
135 ibid.
136 Favero and Missale (n 23) 116.
137 Panico and Suarez (n 51) 26.
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the issue of Eurobonds would have to provide estimates of off-budget
liabilities, net asset positions and long-term budgetary trends to an expert
committee.13 8 Eijffinger's proposal of a Fiscal Experts Panel (FEP) would
be applicable in such a framework, albeit in a slightly different form.
Under the auspices of the EFSF (ESM), the FEP would analyse each
country's deficits and debt levels as well as fiscal policy and monetary
trends. Based on these factors, the FEP would then determine a
corresponding allocation of Eurobonds to be issued.
In order to avoid free-riding and moral hazard, the FEP would
impose specific limits on the volume of bonds a country can issue
annually. Countries would not be allowed to issue Eurobonds exceeding
60% of their GDP. Moreover, it would be prohibited to authorise a net
increase in their total Eurobond responsibilities that would amount more
than 3% of their annual GDP. Consequently, Eurobonds would only be
available for funding sustainable debt. Debt amounting to more than 60%
of GDP would have to be financed through national government bonds.
As they are subject to the financial markets, they would attract a different
rating and thus a higher interest rate compared to Eurobonds. This would
provide clear incentives not to engage in excessive borrowing because the
costs would be considerably higher.' 3 9 Under this system, there would be
clear rewards for enforcing fiscal discipline in the form of cheaper budget
financing and clear penalties for failing to do so through higher prices.
Boonstra would criticise that 'countries still are vulnerable for swings in
market sentiment'. 140 However, this would only be true for excessive
debt. In fact there are strong incentives for countries to reduce their
deficits and run prudent fiscal policies. Although the risk of default under
this scheme is very low, the classic conflict with the no-bailout clause
remains. This could be solved by introducing an adequate insolvency
mechanism. After Greece's debt restructuring which featured a 6206
billion bond exchange and is now considered the 'biggest sovereign
default in history'" 4 1 sovereign insolvency is no longer anathema. In fact,
as of 1 January 2013, CACs will be included in all new euro area
138 Buti, Eij ffinger and Franco (n 38) 26.
139 Erik Jones, 'A Eurobond Proposal to Promote Stability and Liquidity while
Preventing Moral Hazard' (2010) 180 ISPIPolicy Brief 2.
140 Boonstra (n 109) 6.
141 'The wait is over' The Economist (London, 17 March 2012), 67.
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government securities with maturity above one year. 14 2 Thus, under an
insolvency mechanism, negotiations with private bondholders could be
conducted swiftly, allowing a country to restructure its debt in an orderly
manner, thus preventing panic in the financial markets. In order to avoid
an arduous and lengthy amendment process at the EU level, such a
sovereign insolvency mechanism could be created by way of an
intergovernmental agreement between the members of the Eurozone.
The other problem is the fact that countries with high credit ratings
and low interest rates such a Germany may face higher costs through
Eurobonds. The pertinent issue is whether they would agree to dilute their
credit rating by issuing joint bonds with countries with weaker ratings.14 3
The German finance minister suggested that Germany could face extra
annual funding costs of up to 63bn. 14 4 While, at the time of writing,
Germany vehemently opposes the introduction of Eurobonds, it may
actually benefit from them. German banks would consider them a very
attractive and safe investment. Many more banks would likely follow
suit. The resulting stabilisation of the European banking sector and the
stabilisation of the European periphery would further boost the German
export sector.145 Moreover, given the weak status of the Dollar,
Eurobonds with extreme liquidity and low credit risk could rival
American's treasuries market for liquidity, supplanting the status of the
Dollar as reserve currency. 146 The higher interest rates would be a trade
off for economic stability. In any case, these would be minor costs
compared to Germany's participation in the recent bailout packages. As
an example, Germany contributes £22 billion to the paid-in capital of the
ESM while also securing guarantees of up to £168 billion. Moreover, the
higher costs may just be temporary since increased attractiveness to
investors is likely to enhance the credit rating of Eurobonds, which would
over time decrease interest rates.
142 Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Article 12 (3).
143 Thomas Mayer, 'Market view', in Jean Pisani-Ferry and Adam S. Posen (eds), The
Euro At Ten: The Next Global Currency (The Peterson Institute for International
Economics 2009), 178.
144 Wolfgang Mtinchau, 'The Benefits of a Single European Bond' Financial Times
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I. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the proposed introduction of Eurobonds would
significantly strengthen the fiscal policy framework of the EMU. They
would provide short-flexibility since access to financial markets and high
levels of liquidity would allow countries to respond to shocks. And the
incentive of cheap budgetary funding would enforce fiscal discipline
while also ensuring economic recovery and long-term sustainable debt
levels in the Eurozone. A further step forward would now be the
establishment of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) as a platform to
coordinate national fiscal policies and monetary policy. It could also
coordinate the issue of Eurobonds and provide funding to countries facing
financial difficulties.14 7 In the author's opinion this would be a desirable
development but, given the current turmoil, would come too early. It
would therefore be advisable to wait with the creation of a European
Monetary Fund until the Eurobonds system has proven successful and
deficits in the Eurozone have returned to relatively sustainable levels. If
the system is effective, this will serve as an automatic incentive to enter
discussions about extending Eurobonds to the EU as a whole.
Establishing a European Monetary Fund would then be a major move in
the direction of a political union. However, these developments should
not be rushed. Nonetheless, Eurobonds would be an important first step
towards further political integration.
147 Thomas Mayer, 'The Case for a European Monetary Fund' (2009) 44
Intereconomics 140.
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